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I. INTRODUCTION

Ten years after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education,' now a symbol of the beginning of the end of racial
discrimination, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 Title VII opened the workplace to all races and women in ways
that had not previously existed. While discrimination in the workplace
has not disappeared in the forty years since Title VII's enactment, one
sees minorities and women in a greater variety of jobs, and at higher
levels, 3 than one would have seen a generation ago. 4
The promise of Brown, however, has not been achieved.5 When one
looks at public schools fifty years after Brown, a great number are still
racially segregated, and those whose populations are made up primarily
of minorities are often impoverished.6 Both Brown and Title VII
identified the right to be free from discrimination, but that right was not
self implementing. Eliminating discrimination required, and requires,
effective remedies.
This Article compares and contrasts the lack of success in desegregating
the schools with the greater success in eliminating discrimination from
the workplace and suggests that the workplace and schoolhouse can act
together for the benefit of both. Part II theorizes that Brown might, in
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5 (2000).
3. See William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the
Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1704-08 (1986) (describing gains made by blacks in the
workplace, but also noting that many blacks still lack opportunities); cf Mary E. Becker,
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and
Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1669 (1991) (discussing the
continuing existence of employment discrimination, but noting that empirical evidence
shows employment gains for women and minorities because of Title VII as well as a
change in cultural attitudes).
4.

See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND

THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 139 (2004) (noting that even six years

after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 most institutions were predominantly
composed of white males).
5. See id. at 136 ("[T]he promise of Brown proved a mirage."); Mark Tushnet,
The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 173, 175 (1994)
(describing a theory that Brown failed because schools did not become desegregated);
Davison M. Douglas, Introduction, The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 337, 339 (1995) (claiming Brown did not fulfill the expectation that it
would end racial inequality); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face:
Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 668 (1995)
(arguing that the Brown decision has failed to eliminate racial segregation in the U.S.);
Cheryl Brown Henderson, The Legacy of Brown Forty Six Years Later, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 70, 76 (2000) (noting that the majority of African-American students in the United
States remain in segregated schools).
6. See BELL, supra note 4, at 114, 127-29 (stating that schools and neighborhoods,
particularly inner urban and rural, tend to be more segregated and worse off than before
Brown).
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hindsight, have been more successfully implemented 7 and demonstrates
why what might have been done earlier probably would not work today.
Part III compares the plight of students who have not been helped by
Brown with the plight of working parents whose family demands have
kept them from sharing fully in the promise of Title VII. It suggests,
given the greater success of racial integration in the workplace than in
the schoolhouse, that the workplace and schoolhouse might work together
to benefit both.
II. DESEGREGATION DILEMMA
A. History
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court held that governments violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
when they required schools to be segregated by race, even if the schools
had equal resources, which in reality they rarely, if ever, had.8 To
overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,9 the Court relied on findings by trial courts,
whose cases were consolidated in Brown, that the schools were separate
but being equalized.' 0 Plessy had held, in the context of seating on
railway carriages, that separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites
satisfied the demands of equal protection." A year after the Court in
Brown overruled Plessy, it reviewed the remedial portion of the cases
and ordered desegregation with "all deliberate speed."12
Desegregation orders by district courts implementing Brown were
resisted and defied. 13 In the new era of television, people around the
nation and the world saw the ugly resistance and defiance, and the often

7. See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (collecting alternative opinions from scholars); BELL, supra
note 4, at 20-28 (writing an alternative opinion that Brown should have enforced the
equality required by Plessy rather than overruling that case).
8. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
9.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 483.
10. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492 & n.9 (summarizing trial court findings of
"substantial equality" between black and while schools or school districts progressing in
good faith toward equalizing schools).
11. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49.
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown I1).
13. See BELL, supra note 4, at 19 (noting resistance to desegregation was "open
and determined"); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance,92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983)
(describing many types of resistance by whites to desegregation).
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violent mistreatment of blacks by whites. 14 Against this background of
discrimination, and following the command of equality articulated by
Brown, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Title VII of that
Act prohibited employers and unions from discriminating against
' '16
employees because of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Even after the passage of Title VII, courts were still struggling with
how to desegregate the schools despite the fact that the Act had included
Title VI, which prohibited institutions, including schools, that received
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race. 17 Title VI did not
provide a structure for desegregating schools; rather, it provided that
18
federal funds would be withdrawn from institutions that discriminated.
Title VII provided a detailed approach for ending discrimination in the
workplace.
The major affirmative remedy under Title VII was "reinstatement or
hiring" of employees discriminated against. 19 Although school districts
differed in substantial ways from employers, courts attempted a type of
"instatement" remedy, inclusion of black students into white schools.
20
Although faced with delaying tactics by states and school districts,
some trial courts ordered administrators of previously all white public
schools to admit a few black students. 2 1 Those courts, however, did not
14. See BELL, supra note 4, at 134 (listing the types of abuse covered by television
journalists).
15. See id. at 135-36 (describing differing views as to whether the Civil Rights
Act was enacted because of Brown or would have been enacted in any event at that
time).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-2000(e)-2(b) (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
18. Id. § 2000d-l(1). In the years following passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, regulations giving guidance for desegregation were promulgated pursuant both to
Title VI, 29 U.S.C., and congressional acts that provided school funding. The guidance
was not explicitly provided in the congressional statutes. See Neal Devins & James B.
Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation
Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1245-57 (1984) (discussing regulations under
Title VI and various education funding statutes).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).
20. See ROBERT J. CoTrROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,
CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 187-202 (2003) (describing many of the tactics used

by school boards to delay implementation of desegregation); BELL, supra note 4, at 96,
212-13 & n.4 (describing delays from procedural issues raised in courts).
21. See, e.g., Adams v. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 232 F. Supp. 692, 698 (E.D.S.C. 1964)
(ordering school district to admit six black children to white school); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 5, 14 (1958) (affirming court order to require white high school in Little
Rock, Arkansas to admit a few black students); see also BELL, supra note 4, at 95
(describing resistance to admission of black students into white high school in Little
Rock, Arkansas by governor of Arkansas); cf. Steiner v. Simmons, 11 A.2d 574, 579
(Del. 1955) (holding, in a case prior to the decision of Brown II, that school board
exceeded its authority in ordering black students be admitted to white schools because
the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown I had not yet ordered desegregation).
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deal first with the reality that the segregated schools were separate and
unequal.22
Although Title VII and Brown both had the goal of ending discrimination,
employers and schools have different functions. Employers can choose
among applicants and hire those needed for the work. Public schools, on
the other hand, educate everyone. Thus, unlike school systems, most
employers did not need to maintain separate but equal establishments to
discriminate. Employers could just exclude those whom they did not
want. At the time of Brown, in areas that permitted or required segregation,
there were slots for blacks in black schools and whites in white schools.
If those schools really had been separate but equal, as the Supreme Court
had assumed, courts might have been able to desegregate schools by
having a number of students trade places, sending some black students to
white schools and some white students to black schools, especially in
areas where the white and black schools were close together. In many
places, while public schools were segregated, neighborhoods were
somewhat integrated.23
Schools did not exchange students, however. 4 Whether such an
exchange would have worked will never be known, as the schools were
not equal. While there were many talented and dedicated black teachers,
the schools were seriously underfunded and lacked facilities and
supplies. 25 Because schools were unequal, large numbers of students
could not immediately be integrated. With only a few black students
initially transferred to white schools, whites had safety in numbers while
22. The trial courts in three of the four cases consolidated in Brown had issued
"equalization" orders to improve the black schools. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 486 n. 1
(1954).
23. See, e.g., Adams, 232 F. Supp. at 698 (ordering school district to enroll black
students in "the white schools to which they would be entitled as a white child living in
the same school zone"); see also BELL, supra note 4, at 90-91 (describing courts'
approval, prior to Brown, of sending black students to black schools further from their
homes than white schools).
24. See, for example, Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Board of Education,423 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1970), in which the court affirmed denial of a temporary restraining order to
close all black school pending outcome of plaintiff's motion to have black and white
children exchanged between black and white schools. The court further refused to
overturn the school board's decision in a voluntary desegregation plan to close the
minority school in an underprivileged area despite plaintiffs' claim that closing the
school and not busing children into it as well as out of it denied them equal protection
because the school board was doing the best it could with existing resources. Id. at 122,
124.
25. See BELL, supra note 4, at 124-25 (describing talent of teachers but disparities
in school budgets).

1699

a few black students had to bear the brunt of taunts and threats.26 Thus,
courts ignored the racially separated schools' inequality at the peril of
integration, illustrating that assumptions in a liability phase should not
necessarily be carried into the remedial phase.
In hindsight, the courts might have tried a two-step remedy: courts
might have first chosen to enforce the equality in "separate but equal,"
and second ordered elimination of the "separate." How long the time
between the two orders should have been, one year or a generation, is
only a subject of debate, as this, too, did not occur. The justices who
decided Brown, however, did not have the benefit of hindsight. Because
an order to equalize the black and white schools would most likely have
been viewed as a decision to delay or even obstruct desegregation, it was
probably unavailable.27 If resources had been used to improve previously
neglected black schools before desegregation, exchanging students between
black and white schools might have been easier than sending a few black
students to white schools. 28 Of course, hostility toward the idea of
putting black and white children in the same school would have still
been an enormous impediment. For example, county officials in Prince
Edward County, Virginia, ordered the schools closed rather than have
black and white children educated together.29
In the employment field, the timing of Congressional legislation
provides a picture of a brief "separate but equal" period. One year
before Congress passed Title VII, it passed the Equal Pay Act.3 ° That
Act requires employers to pay women and men alike if both do the same
work. 31 Thus, the pay inequities between the sexes were addressed
before the barriers to jobs were eliminated by Title VII. One can
roughly analogize correcting unequal pay disparities with correcting
school disparities before eliminating barriers to entry. Of course, the
pay inequities were not corrected in a year, nor are they yet corrected,
26. See generally COTTROL ET AL., supra note 20, at 195 (describing marshals
escorting four black girls to elementary to school amidst taunts and threats).
27. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 27 (writing an alternative opinion to
Brown directing resources to black schools to enforce Plessy, but acknowledging that
such an opinion at the time would have been "condemned").
28. See Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 652-53 (suggesting, before Jenkins was
decided, that improving schools might decrease white resistance to desegregation).
29. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (holding unconstitutional
the county's closing of public schools rather than having black and white children attend
together); see also Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the Southside: A Desegregation
Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 327, 330 (1997) (describing
history of Prince Edward County's desegregation, including resistance of whites to
desegregation despite financial hardship of resistance).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
31. During World War II, a temporary Labor Board prohibited wage differentials
based on race. See BELL, supra note 4, at 132-33.
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but men knew (and know) that they would not be penalized by the
improvement of women's salaries because the Act prohibited employers
from reducing any salaries to equalize pay.32 Similarly, Brown might
have ordered disparities between schools to be remedied, and then
ordered that segregation be eliminated, with the idea that no student
transferred would be disadvantaged by the transfer. Ironically, years
after Brown was decided, courts did order that disparities among schools
be remedied, but times and neighborhoods had changed, and that remedy
was too late.
In recent years, some school districts that were under court orders for
having unconstitutionally segregated schools have been permitted to
terminate judicial supervision. It is not necessary for those school districts
to prove that desegregation has been eliminated, but to show a good faith
effort to do what they could to eliminate segregation.3 3 The 34effects of
"white flight" were held to be beyond the control of the courts.
B. Separate But Equal Too Late
1. White Flight
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the trial judge ordered, over the course of a
number of years, that the Kansas City school system make major
improvements.35 These remedies were necessary, the court held, to
eliminate the vestiges of unconstitutional segregation and to attract back
nonminority students whose parents had fled to the suburbs or enrolled
them in private schools. 36 The judge noted the difficulty of desegregating a
district that was 68.3% black, 37 but was unable to order that students in
the suburbs be exchanged with those who remained in Kansas City
32.

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

33. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (holding that judicial
supervision of school districts can be terminated in incremental stages); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (remanding to the district court to assess whether
school board complied in good faith with past decrees and eliminated vestiges of
discrimination "to the extent practicable"). See generally Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000) (analyzing desegregation cases,
noting many have terminated jurisdiction but concluding there is still a role for courts in
desegregating schools).

34. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250 n.2 (noting that the district court had found residential
segregation not to be a vestige of prior school desegregation).
35. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 75-80 (1995) (Jenkins III).
36. Id. at 74, 76-77.
37. Id. at 76.
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because of the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley.38 In
Milliken, the Court invalidated a city-suburban student exchange remedy
in Detroit, holding that the remedy for segregation could not go beyond
the city's political boundaries unless the outlying political subdivisions
had also been responsible for the unconstitutional desegregation.39
Because the suburbs around Detroit had not discriminated, the Court
reasoned that they could not be included in the remedy. 40 The judge in
Missouri v. Jenkins had similarly found that the suburbs of Kansas City
were not guilty of intentional discrimination. 4'
Missouri v. Jenkins made three trips to the Supreme Court.42 The
Supreme Court, in its third opinion, held that the ambitious remedy was
beyond the scope of the constitutional violation.43 The existing segregation
was no longer the result of state action, but rather was the result of
housing patterns. Whites who could afford to move had fled to the suburbs
or private schools to avoid the results of segregation." Presumably they
fled not solely because of racial prejudice, but also because of concern
about the quality of the public schools.4 5 Thus, the trial court in
Missouri v. Jenkins had sought to alleviate that latter concern by trying
to correct the effects of segregation and to recapture the whites who had
fled. Had some of the previously black schools not been inferior to the
white ones, perhaps some of the white flight to the suburbs would not
have occurred.4 6 Once it had occurred, however, it was hard to reverse.
Presumably it is easier to entice a family to stay put, than to entice one to
return. Once a family has gone to the effort and expense of relocating,
the family probably is not inclined to relocate again. And the family
who did not move physically, but enrolled its children in private schools,
probably does not want its children to change schools again. Had there been
less white flight to the suburbs, desegregation might have been easier to
achieve. Ironically, then, the remedy in Missouri v. Jenkins came too late.
38. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1), aff'd, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (Milliken 11)).
39. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745.
40. Id. at 752.
41. Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. at 95.
42. The first involved attorneys' fees. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)
(Jenkins 1), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), rev'd, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
The second is described infra in the text accompanying notes 56-57.
43. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 94.
44. Id. at 94-95.
45. See BELL, supra note 4, at 112 ("[I]nferiority of black schools kept white
families from moving into predominantly black neighborhoods."). See generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The
Courts'Role, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1597, 1605-09 (2003) (describing causes of white flight).
46. Cf Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 652-53 (suggesting, before Jenkins was decided,
that improving schools might decrease whites' resistance to desegregation).
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2. Cost

The Equal Pay Act required a number of private employers to increase
women's wages. 4 7 Thus, a type of private antidiscrimination "tax" was
imposed. That tax was either passed on to consumers or taken out of
employers' profits to compensate for past economic discrimination of
women. If courts had ordered school districts to allocate resources to
equalize black and white schools as a first step, the costs imposed also
would have been an antidiscrimination tax. Public schools, however, do
not have profits to trim or customers to absorb costs. Public schools rely
on the levy of "real" taxes.
A generation before the judge in Missouri v. Jenkins ordered the
Kansas City public schools to be improved, courts enforcing Brown
ordered desegregation rather than improvements to neglected black
schools.4 8 Had they ordered improvements, given the long period of
neglect, the amount of money needed would probably have been

enormous, 49 as it was in Jenkins.50 In hindsight, again, that amount

might have been less than the costs caused by active opposition that
followed desegregation orders 51 and the costs of busing and other later
orders 2 Of course the courts might have had to use their contempt
powers had school boards refused to raise and allocate money to the
neglected black schools. 3 Failure to allocate resources in the past was
47.

See generally HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., EQUAL PAY FOR WORKING FAMILIES:

NATIONAL AND STATE DATA ON THE PAY GAP AND ITS COSTS (1999) (providing examples
of companies that have had to make back payments in order to adjust for wage
discrimination).
48. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
49. The school board in the Delaware case consolidated with Brown in the
Supreme Court had chosen desegregation as a cheaper alternative than equalizing the
black and white schools. See BELL, supra note 4, at 25 (describing, in an alternative
opinion, the experience of the Delaware case).
50. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1995) (JenkinsIII) (describing more
than $500 million in court ordered capital improvements and $200 million in court
ordered salary increases).
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-BasedSocial Movements on
ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2091 (2002)
(describing the effects after the Brown I decision, generally mentioning the refusal of
some school districts to desegregate and particularly detailing the events in Little Rock,
Arkansas where the governor directed the school district to defy the Brown I decision).
52. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (holding that compensatory and
remedial programs are permissible to correct segregation); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (permitting courts to order busing of
students to correct segregation).
53. Cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267 (1990) (holding district court
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one of the reasons the schools were inadequate in the first place.54 On
the other hand, localities might have felt that they were buying time
from desegregation orders and allocated the funds as the lesser of two
evils. Perhaps, during the period of time that schools were improved,
some attitudes about desegregation might have changed or opposition to
integration might have lessened.
While transferring students between equally good schools might have
been more palatable than sending a few black children to white schools,
a case that reached the Supreme Court a decade after Brown illustrates
how far school officials would go to avoid desegregation. In Griffin v.
County School Board, school officials closed public schools rather than
integrate them. The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's order to the
officials to open the schools and levy taxes. 55 A generation later, in
Jenkins, the Supreme Court invalidated the trial judge's order imposing
taxes to pay for the ordered school improvement.56 Citing Griffin, the
Court held that while federal courts have the power to order officials to
levy taxes, the trial court in Jenkins abused its discretion by imposing a
tax itself 5 Query whether the taxing order, like the improvement
remedy, came too late.
3. Courts or Legislatures
Whether the local governments order a tax increase or whether a court
imposes one relates to a more general question of the relationship
between courts and legislatures. In comparing remedies for employment
and educational discrimination, one notes that the employment remedies
were enacted by Congress, while the desegregation remedies were
ordered by courts. Although one would expect a constitutional right to
education consistent with the equal protection clause to be enforced
more vigorously than a statutory right to freedom from discrimination in
both private and public workplaces, it may at times be the reverse.
abused its discretion in holding city council members personally in contempt without
waiting to see if order against city would be effective in achieving the city's compliance
with a consent decree in housing discrimination case). See generally COTrROL ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 196-97 (describing contempt order against Governor of Mississippi's
opposition to James Meredith's attendance at the University of Mississippi).
54. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 15 (describing disparities between funding
for black and white schools).
55. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
56. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1990) (Jenkins I1), rev'd, 515 U.S. 70
(1995).
57. Id. at 51-52, 55-56 (citing Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (upholding court order to
county officials, who had closed the public schools rather than desegregate them and had
contributed to the support of white private schools, to open public schools and raise taxes
to support them)).
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While there may not be universal support for a particular law, statutes
are enacted pursuant to a democratic concept of elected officials
following the will of the majority.5 8 In addition, statutes can be enacted
after hearings, detailed study, and consideration of broad ramifications.
Statutes can delineate a complex remedial scheme, phase in relief, and
design specific penalties to deter disobedience.5 9
Federal judicial decisions, however, are indirectly democratic.
Federal judges are appointed by those who are elected, but then the
judges and justices serve for life and their salaries cannot be reduced.6 °
Because judges are protected from reprisal, federal judges theoretically61
are able to reach conclusions that do not have majority support.
Almost by definition, one area that might not have majority support is
protection of minority rights. It becomes ironic that while one of the
roles of the federal judiciary is to protect the rights of minorities,
62
enforcement of those rights may depend on the support of the majority.
Had Congress had the support to pass a statute to implement Brown
shortly after it had been decided, schools might be more integrated
today. While Congress did pass Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it did not provide statutory guidance for desegregation 63 the way
Title VII of the same act provided a remedy for employment
discrimination.

58.

See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.

CAL. L. REv. 289, 323 (1995) (noting the perception that legislation is democratic and
the practicality that unpopular legislation will probably not be enacted).
59. See id. at 322-25 (stating that the Congress can consider the broad
implications of a matter, hold hearings, commission studies, and appropriate funds to
enforce the remedy).
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
61. See Bandes, supra note 58, at 303-04 (noting that courts protect civil liberties);
id. at 323 (noting that the "politically insulated federal judiciary" can make unpopular
decisions); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, JurisdictionAs Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article Ii, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 1014-15 (2000) (stating that the
guaranteed life tenure for judges enables them to be independent of political pressure,
but that the independence is limited by the judiciary's reliance on Congress for funding
the courts' administrative staff).
62. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 21 (writing an alternative Brown opinion
saying that the "outraged resistance [of whites] could undermine and eventually negate
even the most committed judicial enforcement efforts" to desegregate the schools).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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IIl. EXCHANGE THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL FOR
THE WORKPLACE SCHOOL

A. A Suggestion
While the idea of desegregating neighborhood schools may be
unrealistic after more than a generation of white flight and the limits set
by the Supreme Court in Milliken and Jenkins, perhaps it is time for the
schools to leave the neighborhood and move to the workplace. Schools
would "move" to the workplace if children could attend schools, either
existing or newly built, where a parent works.6 4 If so, then the
demographic composition of schools might change. This suggestion
would require, at a minimum, a re-examination of the neighborhood
school concept, the cooperation of a number of jurisdictions, whether
they be different school districts or different states, and money. Of
course, having a school near a workplace would not be a particularly
useful option if the school were poor. In the case of urban settings, local
schools may be those from which whites fled years ago. If employers
saw the availability of nearby schools as a family friendly employment
option, then they should have an incentive to see that the schools
improved. Employers might be able to provide money, time, or expertise to
the schools or be able to interest local, state, or federal governments to
do the same.6 5 Whether schools working with employers could improve
would be a serious matter of debate, as school districts with poor schools
are struggling with how to improve them. A full "school-work" plan
cannot be created in an essay, but a few benefits can be suggested.66
B. DesegregationBenefit
Workplaces have become better integrated than neighborhoods and
64. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender
Equal Protection Analysis with Ramificationsfor Pregnancy,Parenting, and Title VII,
50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 907 (1997) (suggesting that students be permitted to attend school
near a parent's workplace); see also John C. Goodman, School Choice vs. School
Choice, 45 How. L.J. 375, 387 (2002) (arguing that students should have a choice of
schools not dependent upon the family income and noting that, in Barbados, parents can
send their children to school where they live or work).
65. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 4, at 172-73 (describing the corporate support that
the Frederick Douglass Academy in Harlem receives).
66. This Article does not solve problems with the "school-work" suggestion.
Whether schools could be improved with resources from without the school system is a
large question. Other problems suggest themselves: Who would fund the school? How
can children be attracted from neighborhood or private schools to a school near an
employment center? What would happen if an employee is terminated or resigns? What
happens when workplaces and neighborhoods are in different jurisdictions? Who would
elect the school board and make final decisions? Who might be potentially liable and for
what? What type of transportation, if any would be provided? And so on.
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thus neighborhood schools.67 If schools were to follow employment
patterns rather than housing patterns, more racial diversity should appear
in the schools. More economic diversity should also appear because
people who work in the same place do not have the same salaries.6 8
Children who have not been helped by Brown might benefit by having
an alternative to a neighborhood school or a substitute, such as a charter
school or vouchers. Locating schoolrooms near workplaces could have
advantages for employees and employers, too.
C. Employees' Benefits
Employees who are parents have been less well served than others by
Title VII. With more employment opportunities for women and minorities,
more families with children have begun to have both parents in the
workplace. This has created a demand for childcare and other family
accommodations, the lack of which has kept some parents, especially
mothers, out of the workforce or underemployed. 69 There are very few
statutes that help parents balance family and work responsibilities. Title
70
VII provides that employers not discriminate against pregnant women.
The Family and Medical Leave Act 71 provides job protection for
employees of large companies who take twelve weeks of unpaid leave
for the birth, adoption or serious illness of a child. Neither of these
statutes helps parents with the many demands they face.72 While a bill
was introduced in Congress73 to protect parents from employment
discrimination, it did not pass.
67. See supra note 3.
68. Studies indicate that the same student will do better in a school in an affluent
area than in a poor area. See Peter Zamora, Note, In Recognition of the Special
Educational Needs of Low-Income Families?:Ideological Discordand Its Effects upon
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of 1965 and 2001, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 413, 413-14 (2003) (reviewing studies of achievement levels of
students depending upon income levels).
69. See generally Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 64 (arguing that more family
friendly arrangements in the workplace should be required by Title VII).

70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
72. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment
Penaltiesfor Pregnancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 355-57
(1999) (discussing the inadequacies of legal employment protections for childrearing).
73. See generally Peggie R. Smith, Parental-StatusEmployment Discrimination:A
Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569 (2002) (analyzing the
proposed Discrimination Against Parents Act and other legislative alternatives to protect
parents in the workplace).
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One of the major demands a parent faces is making sure a child is in a
safe environment. For the middle class, that demand was often met by a
mother at home. With more parents no longer at home all, the need for
daycare has expanded.7 4 A school near a parent's workplace could
fulfill two functions: education for the child and daycare for the parent.
This would be particularly helpful if the school had hours coordinated
with the workplace and educated children younger than those now
considered "school aged." Besides providing peace of mind, it might enable
a parent to spend more time with children by commuting together or
being close enough to spend some time at the school. Since parental
involvement is frequently cited as an important factor in the success of a
child,75 children and schools would benefit as well as parents.
D. Employer Benefits
Employers could also benefit. They lose productivity when their
workers worry about whether they have enough time with their children
or where they are. Nearby schools might give parents peace of mind and
employers a boost in productivity. Many employers see that family
friendly benefits help attract and retain good employees.76
Some employers are concerned about a shrinking pool of educated
workers, making it particularly important for them to be able to attract
and retain employees. 77 With schools available as family friendly
benefits, both parents and employers would be invested in the success of
the schools. Better schools and better student success would contribute
to better future workers. Well-educated children would become another
generation of employees.
IV. CONCLUSION

The era of desegregation has created many ironies: the remedy of
improving minority schools was ordered too late, the remedy of court
ordered taxes was too late, congressional action was too little, and courts
now have terminated judicial supervision of school districts without
74.

See Kovacic-Fleischer,

supra note 64, at 905-07 (discussing need for

nonparental childcare because many women who traditionally had raised children at
home are now in the workforce).
75. See Nancy Buchanan, The Effects of Parental Involvement on 12th Grade
Achievement, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 75 (1998) (reviewing studies and conducting a
study showing correlations between differing types of parental involvement and student
success).
76. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 64, at 905 n.337 (discussing employers who
find family friendly policies cost effective).
77. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF
NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN 20 (1991).
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having achieved desegregation of the schools. The era of desegregation
also created Title VII and much desegregation of the workplace. Perhaps
it would be possible to place schools in a location less segregated than
the neighborhood. Employers and school districts might want to
consider a school-near-work because the interests of employers,
employees, and children intersect with each other, and with the goal of
improved and desegregated education.
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